Ryan Cohen spent Sunday evening (May 3) announcing a $55.5 billion bid for eBay. By Monday night (May 4), the most credible value investor in GameStop’s corner had sold every share he owned.
Michael Burry did not leave quietly. He explained exactly why. And his words are worth reading carefully.
What Burry said about GameStop on Substack
“I sold my entire GME position,” Burry wrote in a Substack post Monday evening, according to CNBC. “Any which way I sliced it, the Instant Berkshire thesis was never compatible with more than 5x Debt/EBITDA, never ok with interest coverage under 4.0x.”
He closed with a line that will follow this deal for a long time. “Never confuse debt for creativity,” Burry wrote, CNBC confirmed.
Fund manager buys and sells
He also challenged the strategic logic directly.
“Ryan cannot be after fat to cut, if only because no amount of cut fat makes this deal work,” he said, according to Sherwood News.
The post represents the first time Burry has fully sold a position since launching his Substack.
What the “Instant Berkshire” thesis was
To understand why Burry’s exit matters, you have to understand what he was originally buying. In January, Burry disclosed he was accumulating GameStop shares and explicitly compared Ryan Cohen’s capital allocation approach to Warren Buffett‘s early Berkshire Hathaway playbook, according to MarketDash.
Patient, opportunistic, and powered by a growing cash pile rather than borrowed money.
Burry called that thesis “Instant Berkshire.” The idea was that Cohen would compound capital slowly, make disciplined acquisitions, and build a durable business without stretching the balance sheet.
That was the version of GameStop Burry believed in. It is not the version Cohen announced Sunday night.
A $55.5 billion offer for eBay from a company with a market cap of approximately $12 billion is not patient capital allocation. It is an aggressive leveraged bet. And Burry’s math on what that bet actually costs is blunt: at $125 per share, the deal would push leverage to roughly 7.7 times debt to EBITDA, a level Burry described as “bordering on distressed,” according to CNBC.
Why the leverage math troubles Burry
Burry’s framework is not simply that he dislikes debt. It is that he believes highly leveraged companies lose the thing that makes them competitive. “The more likely outcome at the higher price sees leverage rise to 7.7x, a level of debt that borders on distressed and tends to strip competitiveness and innovation from such-stricken companies,” he wrote, according to Stocktwits.
